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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Global Crossin Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones
Telecommunications, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007).
LAW: Failure of a carrier to pay an operator compensation
for phone calls as directed by 47 U.S.C. §276(b)(1)(A) is an
unreasonable practice under 47 U.S.C. §201(b). A cause of
action for damages may be brought under 47 U.S.C. §207.
FACTS: In 1990, Congress enacted special legislation that
required payphone operators to allow payphone users to obtain
free access to the long-distance carrier of their choice, even
without depositing coins. In recognizing that the call would
impose costs upon the payphone operator, Congress authorized
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
promulgate regulations to provide compensation to these
operators. The FCC, using traditional rate-making methods,
promulgated a specific amount to be reimbursed, unless the
operator and the carrier agreed to different amounts. The FCC
also determined that a carrier's refusal to reimburse an
operator was an "unreasonable practice" and unlawful under
47 U.S.C. §201(b). This section had a link to 47 U.S.C. §207
which authorized a payphone operator to bring a federal-court
lawsuit against the carrier.
In 2003, respondent Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.
("Metrophones"), brought suit in federal court against Global
Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. ("Global Crossing") for
compensation owed under the act. The District Court agreed
with the FCC's determination that Global Crossing's refusal to
pay amounted to a §201(b) violation and permitted
Metrophones to sue in federal court under §207. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination. Global
Crossing appealed this decision.
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ANALYSIS: The Court notes that the history of these
sections makes clear that the purpose of §207 is to allow
persons injured by §201(b) violations to bring federal-court
actions. Additionally, history also shows that the FCC has
long implemented §201(b) through the issuance of rules and
regulations. The Court acknowledged that the issue isn't
whether §207 covers actions for violations of §201(b), because
it plainly does. Instead, the Court must decide whether the
particular FCC regulation lawfully implements §201(b)s
unreasonable practice prohibition.
The Court, citing Chevron, stated that the FCC's unreasonable
practice determination is reasonable and therefore lawful
because it easily fits within the statutory phrase. Moreover,
when Congress revised the telecommunications laws in 1996
to enhance competition, it left §201(b) in place. In the absence
of Congressional prohibition, and the similarities with
traditional regulatory action, the Court found the FCC's
determination reasonable.
The Court rejected various arguments by Global Crossing,
including the argument that §207 authorizes only actions
seeking damages for statutory violations and not for violations
of regulations promulgated to carry out statutory objectives.
The Court reasoned that even though this lawsuit does seek
damages for a statutory violation of §201(b)s prohibition of
unreasonable practice, prohibitions have long been thought to
extend to rates that come from FCC prescriptions.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit's judgment that the FCC's
application of §201(b) is lawful and §207 allows the operator
to sue the carrier was affirmed.
IMPACT: Operators have a cause of action in federal court
when carriers do not allocate and pay compensation to
operators from long-distance calls made without coins from
phone booths.
Beck v. PACE International Union et al., 127 S. Ct. 2310
(2007).
LAW: Under 29 U.S.C. §1341 (b)(3)(A)(i), merger with a
multi-employer plan is not a permissible method for
terminating a single-employer defined-benefit pension plan,
and the therefore the employer does not have a fiduciary
obligation under ERISA to consider that method for
terminating the plan.
FACTS: PACE International Union (PACE) represented
employees covered by a single-employer defined-benefit
pension plan which was sponsored and administered by Crown
Paper and its parent company Crown Vantage, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to in singular as "Crown"). After filing
for bankruptcy, Crown considered a standard termination
though the purchase of annuities, which is a statutorily
specified method plan termination under § 1341 (b)(3)(A)(i) of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"). Additionally, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC"), which administers an insurance
program to protect plan benefits, agreed to withdraw the
proofs of claim it had filed against Crown if this termination
method was used.
PACE interrupted Crown's plan termination discussions and
proposed that Crown instead merge plans with PACE's own
multi-employer plan. Crown's termination method would
allow Crown to retain an estimated $5 million of over funding
to use for creditors. PACE's termination method would allow
PACE's own multi-employer plan to retain the $5 million in
over funding.
Crown moved forward with its preferred termination method
of the annuity purchase which prompted PACE to file an
adversary action against Crown in Bankruptcy Court. The
court sided with PACE because it found that the termination
method decision was a fiduciary decision and Crown had not
given sufficient consideration of the proposal. The District
Court affirmed in relevant part. The Court of Appeals for the
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Ninth Circuit did as well, but acknowledged that the
termination decision was a business decision not subject to
ERISA's fiduciary obligations, but also reasoned that the
implementation of a decision to terminate is fiduciary in
nature. It determined that the merger method was a
permissible means of plan termination and therefore Crown
had a fiduciary obligation to consider that method seriously.
Crown appealed this decision.
ANALYSIS: The Court starts off by stating that ERISA sets
forth exclusive procedures for standard termination of single-
employer pension plans in §1341(b)(3)(A). Subsection (i)
expressly permits termination through purchase of annuities,
which is the most common termination method. Subsection
(ii), which is a residual clause, is potentially more embracing
of alternative methods of plan termination. It is this clause
that PACE argues would allow the merger method of plan
termination. The Court rejects PACE's argument because
PBGC disagrees that merger is a permissible method and the
Court traditionally defers to PBGC when interpreting ERISA.
PACE failed to convince the Court that PBGC's interpretation
is unreasonable. One reason is because Congress nowhere
expressly provided for merger as a permissible means of
termination. The court notes three additional reasons why
PACE's interpretation that mergers are permissible under
subsection (ii) lacks clarity. First, termination through
purchasing annuities formally severs ERISA's applicability to
plan assets, whereas termination through merger results in the
former plan's assets remaining within ERISA's purview.
Second, ERISA expressly allows the employer to recoup
surplus funds, as Crown sought to do here and the merger
method would preclude receipt of such funds. Third, merger is
nowhere mentioned in §1341, but instead is dealt with in an
entirely different set of statutory sections with different rules
and procedures.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit's holding that a merger was a
permissible means of plan termination and therefore Crown
had failed in its fiduciary obligation to consider this proposal
for termination seriously was reversed and remanded.
IMPACT: This holding narrows the potential alternative
methods to be used in defined-benefit pension plans under
§1341(b)(3)(A)(ii). This is another example of the Court
giving deference to an agency's, or in this case a government
corporation's, interpretation when Congress has not expressly
spoken on the issue.
Long Island Care at Home. Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339
(2007).
LAW: The Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(15)
exemption from minimum wage and maximum hours rules for
companionship workers employed in domestic service
employment includes those workers employed by third party
agencies.
FACTS: Respondent, a domestic worker who provided
companionship services to elderly and infirm men and women
sued her employer, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. (Long
Island Care) for failure to pay her minimum wages and
overtime wages. The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA")
§213(a)(15) exempts workers who provide companionship
services employed in domestic services. The Department of
Labor (DOL) promulgated a regulation that states the
exemption includes those companionship workers who are
employed by an employer, agency other than the family, or
household using their services. The District Court found the
DOL's third party regulation valid and controlling and
consequently dismissed Respondent's lawsuit. The Second
Circuit found the DOL's third party regulation unenforceable
and set aside the District Court's judgment. Long Island Care
sought certiorari and the petition was granted.
ANALYSIS: The Court stated that the FSLA explicitly left
gaps as to the scope and definition of its domestic service and
companionship services terms, and Congress empowered the
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DOL with authority to fill those gaps. Respondent argued that
domestic service employment is treated differently in the
DOL's General Regulations and the regulation in question.
The Court stated that although the literal language of the third
party regulation and the General Regulation conflict, it
nonetheless agreed with the DOL's position for four reasons.
First, a decision that the General Regulation controlled would
create serious problems as to the coverage of particular
domestic service workers by the statutory exemption and by
the FSLA as a whole. Second, the General Regulation's
purpose is to describe the kind of work that must be performed
to qualify as domestic service and the third party regulation is
for the sole purpose of explaining how the exemption applies
to third party domestic service workers. Therefore the third
party regulation is more specific to the question at issue and
therefore governs. Third, the DOL reached the interpretation
after going through a notice and comment rulemaking
procedure making surprises unlikely. Fourth, this Court has
accepted such interpretations where the agency's course of
action indicates that its interpretation reflects the agency's
views and not post hoc rationalization.
The Court also rejected Respondent's argument that the third
party regulation is not meant to fill a statutory gap, but is a
description the DOL's view of what the FSLA means and
therefore is not entitled to Chevron deference. It reasoned that
the DOL did not have to comply with notice and comment for
an interpretation, but did so because it treated the regulation as
a binding exercise of its rulemaking authority. Finally, the
Court also rejected Respondent's argument that the notice and
comment proceedings were defective because the final rule
was a logical outgrowth of the rule proposed by the DOL.
HOLDING: The Second Circuit's judgment that the DOL
third party regulation was unenforceable was reversed and
remanded.
IMPACT: Domestic service employees who perform
companionship services, including those employed by third
party agencies, are exempt from FLSA minimum wage and
maximum hour requirements. This holding confirms the
DOL's expansion of the FSLA exemption for domestic service
workers who are employed for companionship services.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Groffv. United States, 493 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
LAW: Chevron deference applies to agency interpretations
made in informal adjudications.
FACTS: Two cases, Groff and LaBare were consolidated on
appeal from the Court of Federal Claims which involved
challenges to Bureau of Justice Assistance ("BJA")
determinations that denied benefits to the relatives of pilots
who were employed by private contractors and died rendering
fire suppression services to public agencies. The benefits were
denied because the BJA ruled that neither of the pilots were a
"public safety officer" within the meaning of the Public Safety
Officers' Benefits Act ("PSOBA") because both parties were
employees of private companies and therefore were not
serving a public agency in an official capacity.
Both claimants appealed the BJA decisions to the Court of
Federal Claims, which rendered different holdings for each
case. The court held in one case that the BJA's denial of
benefits was erroneous and awarded benefits, while a different
judge for the same court affirmed the BJA's decision to deny
benefits in the other case.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that in determining whether
Chevron deference is warranted in the agencies interpretation
of "public safety officer" is whether Congress meant to
delegate to the agency the authority to make determinations
having the force of law. The court noted that a very good
indicator of congressional intent can be found in express
language giving authorization to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudications which produces regulations or
rulings for which deference is claimed. In the PSOBA,
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Congress expressly authorized the BJA to establish rules,
regulations, and procedures to carry out the purposes of the
act. Specifically, Congress expressly authorized the BJA to
determine regulations regarding if a public safety officer has
died as the direct and proximate results of an injury sustained
in the line of duty. The court cited two cases holding that the
BJA's interpretations of statutory terms should receive
Chevron deference. The court rejected the claimants attempt
to distinguish a case because it involved and interpretation of a
regulation promulgated through traditional notice and
comment rulemaking and the other case because it was
decided before the Supreme Court interpreted Chevron
restrictively. The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court in
later cases has made clear that Chevron deference is not
limited to formally promulgated regulations. Additionally, the
court stated that it was reasonable to conclude that Congress
contemplated the BJA would use the process of adjudicating
claims to make legal determinations necessary to fill in gaps of
the statutory standards. Finally, the court noted that legislative
history confirms, at a minimum, that the BJA's interpretation
of "public safety officer" is a plausible interpretation of the
statute and therefore is reasonable.
HOLDING: The court reversed the Groff holding awarding
benefits, and affirmed the LaBare holding denying benefits.
IMPACT: Agency interpretations of a statute made through
informal adjudication deserve Chevron deference. This
decision expands the application of Cheron deference given to
agencies.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - NINTH CIRCUIT
Aageson Grain & Cattle v. USDA, 500 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir.
2007)
LAW: Proceedings of the National Appeals Division
("NAD") qualify under §554 of the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), therefore the Equal Access to Justice Act
("EAJA") applies to those proceedings.
FACTS: After winning an appeal for denial of assistance
under the 2003 Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program
("NAP"), three farms applied for an award of attorney's fees
and expenses under EAJA totaling $17, 943.84. NAD refused
to consider the application, because it was the United States
Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") position that the EAJA
was inapplicable to NAD proceedings. The farmers filed for
judicial review and cross-motions were filed by both the
farmers and the USDA. The district court granted the farmers'
motion for summary judgment, concluding that the NAD
proceedings were an "adversary adjudication" under 5 U.S.C.
§504(a)(1) (2000). After entering judgment, the district court
ordered the case remanded to NAD for a determination of the
proper attorney's fee and costs awards under EAJA. The
USDA appealed the district court's order.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the USDA's argument that
the denial of benefits under the Disaster Assistance Program
under the NAD was not an "adversary adjudication" because it
was not "under" APA §554. The court looked to the
legislative history of the EAJA, which states that if an agency
takes a position at some point in the adjudication, the
adjudication would then become adversarial. The court
acknowledged that in the NAD hearing, the United States had
a formal position. The court also looked to an 1 1 th Circuit case
which concluded that in the case of a challenge to the denial of
benefits under a disaster assistance program, a proceeding
before the NAD was 'adversarial' in nature.
After determining that NAD proceedings are adversarial
adjudications within the meaning of APA §504, the court had
to determine whether the proceedings are "under" APA §554.
This section applies in every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record and have the
opportunity for an agency hearing. This requirement has three
components including that the adjudication must be required
by statute, it must be on the record, and there must be an
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opportunity for an agency hearing. The USDA challenged
whether application of APA §554 to NAD hearings is
mandatory. The court looked to the plain meaning of the
statutory language of U.S.C. §6996(a) which compels NAD
adjudications. It states that participants shall have the right to
appeal an adverse decision by the division. Therefore, the
statute creating the NAD satisfies the requirements for the
application of the APA §554.
HOLDING: The District Court's judgment that EAJA
applies to NAD proceedings is affirmed.
IMPACT: Private litigants who prevail against the federal
government in administrative adjudication under the USDA
NAD process are entitled to recover attorney's fees under
EAJA. This holding expands the applicability of EAJA fee
awards to administrative appeal proceedings, not just court
proceedings, and makes it less costly for private parties who
litigate with the government in administrative proceedings
because of they win, they can recover reasonable attorney's
fees from the government.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Walsh v. Heilmann, 472 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2006).
LAW: Hearing officers cannot be removed from their
appointed position because of political reasons.
FACTS: After being elected, a mayor appointed a new
administrative hearing officer. The replaced officer argued
that he was replaced because he backed the other losing
candidate in the mayoral election. He claimed the new mayor
wanted his own supporters in plum positions which violated
the first amendment as applied to political patronage. The
District Court dismissed the complaint after concluding that
hearing officers are the sort of position for which politics is a
permissible consideration.
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals agreed with the District
Court's reasoning that because all non-vehicular subjects were
under the discretion of the hearing officer to determine fines
ranging from zero to $50,000, this was a position that made
policy and therefore views about wise public administration
were appropriate. Ordinance issues and violations such as
failure to trim hedges, shoveling snow from sidewalks, and
raking leaves are decided by the hearing officer, but can affect
a mayor's success in office. This makes it appropriate for a
mayor to appoint officers who share his or her views about
enforcement priorities. The court cited its own prior holding
in Kurowski v. Krajewski which held that politics is a
permissible consideration for judicial positions, even those
held for just a short time.
The court rejected the appellant's argument that Kurowski
should be limited to appointed part-time judges when the full-
time position is elected. It discussed how federal
administrative appeals judges at federal agencies serve at the
pleasure of the cabinet officials so that the policies of the
executive branch are carried out. Since the hearing officer has
such discretion in enforcement of ordinances, it is important
that the officer be held by someone who holds the elected
official's confidence.
HOLDING: The District Court's holding that politics was a
permissible consideration for hearing officers who possessed
discretion over which laws received how much enforcement
was affirmed.
IMPACT: Appointed administrative hearing officer positions
are subject to political considerations because of their
enforcement discretion and the impact that discretion has on an
elected official's success in office.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - FIFTH CIRCUIT
Chao v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n.,
480 F.3d 320 (5 th Cir. 2007).
LAW: The authority to assess penalties under Title 29 U.S.C.
§666(j) does not authorize an ALJ to group separately charged
and proven willful offenses for the purposes of assessing
penalties. This section establishes a mandatory penalty range
for each willful violation charged and proven.
FACTS: Two related companies ("Respondents") sharing
space were assessed a total of 141 willful recordkeeping
violations by failing to record certain work-related accidents
and illnesses. In the Secretary's enforcement capacity through
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
investigated, cited, and proposed penalties for the violations.
The Secretary chose not to group the violations, rather cited
and sought penalty for each violation. The Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") treated the companies as if each had
committed one willful violation and assessed a penalty of
$70,000 for each company. The Secretary appealed the ALJ's
penalty assessment to the Commission. The two
commissioners who heard the appeal did not reach an
agreement on the propriety of the ALJ's grouping decision.
An official action of the commission requires an affirmative
vote of two members. Since that did not occur, the
commissioners vacated the direction for review and the case
came to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
ANAYSIS: Initially, the court noted that even though the
violations may stem from a single company policy, each
failure to record may represent a separate and distinct
violation. The court referenced the language of the act under
§666(a) which states that penalties may be assessed not less
than $5,000 and not more than $70,000 for each willful
violation.
The court rejected the Respondent's argument that the
Commission's authority to assess penalties allows grouping
because the act allows the Commission to give due
consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty by
considering factors such as size of business, gravity of the
violation, good faith of the employer, and history of previous
violations. The court stated that the due consideration is to be
given to the amount of penalty for each violation but does not
allow for manipulation of the number of violations so that the
penalty fits his appropriateness determination.
The court noted that the Respondent's argument that the
Commission is not bound to the Secretary's penalty proposals
is correct, but the penalty proposal is the amount the Secretary
is seeking, not the number of violations. Therefore, the
Commission does not have the authority to change the number
of violations.
HOLDING: The court vacated the AL's penalty assessment
and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the
opinion.
IMPACT: Although the Commission has discretion in
determining the amount of penalty to be assessed, it does not
have the discretion to group violations in order to meet that
amount.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - FIRST CIRCUIT
Dominion Energy Brayton Point LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d
12 (1st Cir. 2006).
LAW: The hearing requirement in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a),
1342(a) only requires an informal hearing.
FACTS: In 1998, Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC
(Dominion), an electrical generating facility, applied for
renewal of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit and thermal variance authorization.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued a
proposed final permit in October, 2003 which rejected the
requested thermal variance. Dominion sought review before
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the Environmental Appeals Board ("Board") asking for an
evidentiary hearing. The Board accepted the petition for
review, but declined to convene an evidentiary hearing. In
August, 2004, Dominion notified the EPA of its intent to file a
citizen's suit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") to compel
the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing. After receiving no
reply, Dominion filed complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court
granted the EPA's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds
because the citizen suit was a direct challenge to the EPA's
hearing rule and thus came under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the circuit court under 33 U.S.C. §1369(1)(E). Dominion
appealed.
ANALYSIS: The interpretation of "opportunity for a public
hearing" has led to much confusion. In the past, the EPA
followed the interpretation of "public hearing" that was
established in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, which
established a rebuttable presumption that in the context of
adjudication, an organic statute that calls for a "public
hearing" means that it must comply with the formal
adjudication procedures in the APA. The EPA promulgated
regulations that memorialized the use of formal hearings. This
changed in 1984 when the Supreme Court held in Chevron v.
NRDC, that when a court reviews an agency's construction of
the statute, it must first ask whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question and if not, then the agency's
interpretation must be given deference if reasonable. The EPA
then revised its interpretation to allow for informal hearings to
satisfy the hearing requirement.
The court rejected Dominion's attempt to rely on the Seacoast,
holding because as to the CWA's public hearing language, the
Chevron doctrine trumps the potential application of stare
decisis principles. The Court also discussed a precedent case,
Brand X, which demands the pre-Chevron precedents be re-
examined through a Chevron lens. The court in Seacoast
based their interpretation of "public hearing" not on clear
intent from Congress, rather it settled upon a "best reading" of
the language. This makes the stare decisis effect yield to
contrary, but plausible, interpretations because of the Chevron
Doctrine. Since Congress has not spoken directly to the
precise question at issue, the Court must defer to the EPA's
interpretation as long as it is reasonable. The Court also
rejected Dominion's argument that refusing to follow Seacoast
offends the "law of the circuit rule" because that rule is subject
to exceptions. For instance, when a controlling authority
undermines the decision, like the Supreme Court did with its
holding in Chevron.
HOLDING: The Court affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of Dominion's claim.
IMPACT: The authority provided in the Chevron Doctrine
allows an agency to re-examine interpretations of statutory
language when those interpretations were based on a "best
reading" of the statute and not on express Congressional
intent.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic
Bevera2e Control Appeals Board, 40 Cal. 4th 1 (2006).
LAW: Section 11430.70 (a) of the California APA prohibits
all ex parte contacts in a unitary agency, prior to the rendering
of a final decision, in all non-ratemaking proceedings.
FACTS: The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
("Department") filed accusations of violations of the terms of
licenses against three licensees. The Department followed the
two-stage adjudication process: (1) a department staff attorney
acting as prosecutor and the licensee present their respective
cases to an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ
makes factual findings, prepares a proposed decision, and then
submits it to the Department; (2) the submission is considered
by the Department's Director, who can elect to adopt, modify
or reject the proposal.
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After the close of each hearing and before the final decision
rendered, the prosecutor prepared a report of the hearing which
included a recommended solution, and sent it to the
Department's Chief Counsel, but not to any of the licensees.
In each case, the Department rejected the AL's proposed
decision to dismiss suspending the licenses and substituted its
own decision to suspend the licenses. The licensees appealed
the Department's decision to suspend liquor licenses to the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board ("Board").
ANALYSIS: The Court rejected the Department's argument
that revised California APA §11430.70(a) ex parte contact
limitations extend only to the trial stage and not the decision
stage. The Court reasoned that a review of legislative history
makes clear that §11430.70(a) was intended to apply more
broadly to limit ex parte contacts in all non-ratemaking
proceedings that employ an evidentiary hearing in the course
of adjudication. Review of the official comments to the
section further defined limits on contacts with agency heads
and other decision makers in both trial and decision stages.
Additionally, the Court rejected the Department's argument
that § 11517 gives wide latitude to the Department to structure
its adjudicative proceedings. The Court acknowledged that
latitude, but stressed that it still must comply with the
California APA and constitutional minimums. Nothing in
§11517 authorizes procedures to run afoul of proscriptions
spelled out elsewhere in the Government Code.
Finally, the court also rejected the Department's argument that
the records contain no proof that the prosecutor's reports on
the hearings were actually considered by the ultimate decision
maker, because under the California APA, the mere
submission of ex parte substantive comments is illegal.
HOLDING: The Court of Appeal's holding that the practice
of having the agency prosecutor prepare a report of hearing,
including a recommended outcome, and forwarding it to the
Department's Chief Counsel while a final Department decision
was pending, violated the licensee's due process rights was
affirmed.
IMPACT: Due to the California APA and due process
violations, the agency's order was reversed. Real party
interests who receive adverse decisions from unitary agencies
may scrutinize that agency's adjudication process to find APA
and due process violations in order to get decisions reversed.
Carter v. Cal. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 38 Cal. 4th 914
(2006).
LAW: The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) [Gov.
Code] Section 12940 (j) (1), includes sexual harassment
committed by non-employees.
FACTS: A nurse brought suit against her employer, the
California Department of Veteran's Affairs, because she was
sexual harassed by a resident of the veteran's home where she
worked. The complaint alleged that the employer had failed to
take effective steps to stop the harassment. The trial court
ruled that the employer could be held liable for third party
sexual harassment under Gov. Code § 12490 (j)(1) as amended,
but the court of appeal reversed because it concluded that the
code did not impose liability on an employer when its
customers or clients sexually harassed its employees.
ANALYSIS: Since § 12490 (j)(1) was amended subsequent to
the sexual harassment, the court had to determine whether the
amendment changed or clarified the previous language of the
code. The Veterans Affairs ("VA") argued that the
amendment to § 12490 (j)(1), which now had language
imposing liability for acts of non-employees, changed the
statute and therefore could not be retroactively applied to this
case.
The court reviewed legislative history which expressly stated
the Legislature's intent to "clarify" § 12490 (j)(1). The court
recognized that a declaration to clarify existing law cannot be
given an obvious unintended effect. The court also stated that
Fall 2007 Legal Summaries
742 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
when an amendment to clarify is adopted soon after a
controversy, it is logical to regard the amendment as an
interpretation of the original act. Here, the amendment to
§12490 (j)(1) was enacted soon after FEHA did not impose
liability on an employer for a passenger's conduct in Salazar v.
Diversified Paratransit, Inc. Because of the timing of the
amendment and the stated intent to clarify existing law by the
legislature, the court rejected the VA's argument.
Additionally, since the amendment clarified and did not
change the act, the court did not have to address whether
retroactive application would be appropriate and whether that
would implicate due process concerns.
HOLDING: The Court of Appeal's holding that the FEHA
did not impose liability on an employer when its customers or
clients sexually harassed its employees was reversed.
IMPACT: Since the statute in this case had clarified existing
law and did not change law, the court did not address the issue
of retroactivity and possible due process concerns. This leaves
the door for that issue open for future cases.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE COURT
Harkness v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 591 Pa.
543 (2007).
LAW: An employer may be represented at an unemployment
compensation hearing before the Unemployment
Compensation Board referee by an individual who is not an
attorney.
FACTS: After a lewd, verbal confrontation with a customer, a
Macy's Department Store ("Macy's") employee ("claimant")
was subsequently terminated because of her remarks to the
customer. The claimant filed for unemployment compensation
benefits and was denied. Employee appealed and a hearing
was held and was attended by the claimant, her counsel, and a
representative for Macy's who was not an attorney. The
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claimant objected to Macy's being represented by a non-
attorney, but the objection was overruled.
The decision from the hearing was that claimant had violated
Macy's customer service policy and this rose to willful
misconduct and therefore benefits were properly denied.
Claimant appealed this decision to the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review ("Board"), who also
concluded that benefits were properly denied and that the
referee did not err in allowing the employer to be represented
by a non-attorney. Claimant thereafter appealed to the
Commonwealth Court which concluded it was an error for the
referee to allow non-attorney representation because it was
unauthorized practice of law and the Board's order was
vacated. Macy's and the Board both filed petitions for
allowance of appeal from this decision.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the lower court's conclusion
that the non-lawyer representative was practicing law. It
reasoned that the activities performed by an employer
representative are largely routine and primarily focus on
creating a factual basis for the referee's decision.
Additionally, the court recognized that providers of services
such as payroll, tax, and benefits often attend these
proceedings to provide documents and records to aid referee in
decisions. These types of individuals are more akin to
facilitators and do not engage in legal analysis. Also, these
proceedings are informal in nature and are meant to be
efficient. Requiring employers to be represented by counsel
would undermine the informal, speedy, and low cost nature of
the proceedings. Based upon these considerations, the non-
attorney representing an employer before a referee was not
practicing law.
The court had to next determine whether unemployment
compensation law permits non-lawyer representation of the
employer. The court rejected the lower court's reliance on
§702, which applies to limitation of fees and only allows for
the claimant to be represented by a lawyer. Instead, the court
referenced §502 which addresses decisions of a referee and the
Fall 2007
744 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
appeals process. Specifically, the section's language
references "parties" and their attorneys or "other
representatives of record." The statute's language does not
differentiate between claimant and employer; rather it refers to
all parties. Additionally, the language also refers to other
representatives at the referee's hearing. Therefore, non-
lawyers can be representatives of employers in hearings.
HOLDING: The order of the Commonwealth Court that the
non-attorney was practicing law, which allowed for the
Board's decision to be vacated, was reversed and remanded for
proceedings consistent with the opinion.
IMPACT: Non-lawyers may represent an employer in
unemployment compensation hearings. This holding supports
the informal, low cost, and efficient intent of unemployment
proceedings by allowing for employers to utilize non-lawyers
to convey facts on behalf of the employer necessary for the
decision.
IOWA STATE COURT
Doe v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 733 N.W. 2d 705 (2007).
LAW: Iowa Code §272C.6(4) permits disclosure of
complaints pending investigation to other states' medical
licensing authorities.
FACTS: A doctor ("Doe") licensed by the Iowa Board of
Medical Examiners ("Board") applied for a license to practice
medicine in Massachusetts prior to relocating to the state. The
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine
("Massachusetts Board") denied application based on three
complaints pending investigation that the Board had disclosed
to the Massachusetts Board upon request.
Doe filed a complaint with the Iowa State Appeal Board
alleging the Board unlawfully disclosed confidential
information. The State Appeal Board denied Doe's claim.
Doe then filed a petition for judicial review alleging his
substantial rights had been prejudiced by the disclosure of
confidential information. After the hearing, the district court
affirmed the State Appeal Board's denial of Doe's claim
concluding that §272C.6(4) permits the disclosure of
complaints pending investigation to other states' medical
licensing authorities. Doe appealed this decision.
ANALYSIS: The court first determined the standard of
review of the Board's interpretation of §272C.6(4) was for
correction or errors and not the more deferential standard
because the legislature did not give the Board discretion to
determine what information is, and is not, confidential. To
determine legislative intent of §272C.6(4), the court analyzed
the history of the section, starting with when first enacted and
then subsequent amendments.
An amendment made in 1982 included a disclosure exception
that authorized the release of investigative information, which
"relates to licensee discipline", to other states' licensing
authorities. The court rejected Doe's argument that the
exception only allowed disclosure to other states' licensing
authorities after formal disciplinary proceedings had been
initiated. The court discussed that the phrase "relates to
licensee discipline" is used twice in the section; first to
describe the information that must be kept confidential, and
second to describe the information that may be disclosed to
other states' licensing boards. The court concluded that since
§272C.6(4) was intended to ensure broad confidentiality of all
complaint and investigative information pertaining to licensee
discipline, by using this same language to describe information
to be disclosed, the legislature also intended to ensure broad
disclosure to these boards. Since a complaint is the first step
in imposing licensee discipline; it clearly "relates to licensee
discipline."
HOLDING: The district court's ruling that §272C.6(4)
permits disclosure of complaints pending investigation to other
states' medical licensing authorities was affirmed.
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IMPACT: All confidential information in complaint files and
investigative data relate to licensee discipline and therefore
may be disclosed to other states' licensing authorities.
IDAHO STATE COURT
Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 160 P.3d
438 (2007).
LAW: An agency cannot reject fact findings of a hearing
officer, and rely on unexplained agency knowledge and
experience, when the fact findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
FACTS: The Board of Professional Counselors and Marriage
and Family Therapists ("Board"), a licensing board within the
Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, filed a complaint
against a therapist after an altercation with a patient. The
Board alleged that the therapist had violated certain provisions
of the American Counseling Association Code of Ethics
("ACA Code"). After an evidentiary hearing was conducted,
the officer issued factual findings, legal conclusions, and a
recommendation which concluded that the therapists had not
violated the ACA Code.
The Board adopted the officer's factual findings and legal
conclusions, except for the conclusion that there were no
violations of the ACA Code. The Board based this rejection
upon its members' specialized knowledge and experience.
The Board suspended the therapist's license for one year, but
provided for suspension to be stayed if the therapist agreed to
practice under the supervision of a Board-approved counselor,
pay a fine, costs, and attorney fees. The therapist appealed the
Board's decision.
The District Court set aside the Board's order concluding that
the Board had violated the therapist's due process rights
because 1) the Board didn't use its specialized knowledge and
experience to evaluate the evidence, but instead substituted
that knowledge for the evidence presented; 2) it failed to
articulate the standard the therapist violated; and 3) the record
did not disclose the knowledge and experience upon which the
Board based its decision. The District Court also found that
the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it
disregarded evidence presented and failed to articulate
standards. Attorney fees were awarded to the therapist. The
Board appealed this decision.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that it would overturn an
agency's disciplinary decision on appeal only when it violates
a substantial right of the party and where its decision 1)
violates statutory or constitutional provisions; 2) exceeds
agency authority; 3) are made upon unlawful procedure; 4) are
not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or 5) are
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Also, when a
hearing officer's recommendations are not accepted, the court
will review with greater scrutiny. Here, the Board went
against the hearing officer's determination of credibility in
favor of the therapist, and instead determined that its witness
was more credible than the testimony of the therapist.
The hearing officer made a factual finding that the therapist's
method for handling the patient was credible, was in the best
interest of the patient, and therefore was not a violation of the
ACA Code. This factual finding was ignored by the Board,
and instead reached an opposite conclusion relying on its own
knowledge and experience. No where in the record does the
Board explain its knowledge and experience that would
compel a change from the hearing officer's determination.
Because the holder of a professional license has valuable
property right, the Board infringed upon the therapist's
substantial right to practice and therefore setting aside the
Board's order was proper.
HOLDING: District Court's holding to set aside the Board's
action in whole and award attorney fees was affirmed.
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IMPACT: When a hearing officer's fact findings are rejected,
the reviewing court uses strict scrutiny and requires articulated
reasons and standards for the rejection.
